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From the “Thatcherisation of
Europe” to Brexit




1 Wondering what Margaret Thatcher would think about Brexit  could be an amusing
parlour game: the mystically inclined might even try to summon up her spirit with a
Ouija  board.  But  even if  the  Iron Lady were  to  communicate  across  the  ether,  the
message would surely be garbled, given the complexity of Britain’s Brexit predicament.
This can be traced back directly to her days in power. In re-reading Jacques Leruez’s
clear  and  concise  presentation  of  Thatcher’s  relations  to  Europe  in  Le  phénomène
Thatcher,  it  is  striking  to  see  how  many  of  the  ingredients  of  Britain’s  historical
convulsion today emerged during her time in office.1 
2 Thatcher’s own political choices and her demise sprang from her and Britain’s
persistent ambiguities over Europe, which her governments compounded greatly. Work
by Pauline Schnapper, for example, recalls how the UK has always been an ambivalent
partner (partenaire ambivalent) in the EU for multiple institutional, constitutional and
cultural  reasons.  These  include:  Protestantism;  Britain’s  idea  of  Parliamentary
sovereignty;  its  imperial  history  and  rivalry with  other  European  countries;  the
problems Britain feels Europe has caused it, especially the wars in the 20th century; the
UK’s special relationship with the United States; and Britain’s visceral attachment to
free trade.2 Far from supporting European integration enshrined in the idea of “ever
closer  union”,  Britain  has  almost  consistently  rejected  the  EEC/EU3 as  a  political
project.  Instead,  its  participation  in  “Europe”  has  been  motivated  by  economic
considerations,  often  coloured  with  memories  of  previous  policy  failures.  Notably,
Britain did not join the Eurozone in the late 1990s and early 2000s, partly because of the
haunting memory of its ERM/EMS4 membership from 1990 to 1992, which had opened
the floodgates to Eurosceptism. But New Labour’s decisions not to join the Eurozone
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also reflected genuine concerns about the incoherencies of the single currency which
are still  weighing on it  today.5 Britain’s  overall  disposition to the EU has therefore
exhibited a high degree of “path dependency”.6 Successive generations of politicians
have fought almost every proposal of institutional integration, often using economic
arguments to support their positions. Despite growing economic integration, the UK
therefore  did  not  converge  with  its  neighbours  and  partners  in  supporting  the
deepening of the European project. And today, Britain is on the path to Brexit.
3 This  article  demonstrates  how  Mrs  Thatcher’s  years  as  Prime  Minister  intensified
Britain’s  ambivalence  to  Europe.  In  1986,  she  supported  the  creation  of  the  Single
Market as a trade liberalisation project, widely referred to as the “Thatcherisation of
Europe”.7 Yet two years on, her famous Bruges Speech set out Thatcher’s opposition to
the growing federalism of the European Economic Community (EEC). Subsequently, in
early October 1990, Thatcher finally accepted the pound’s membership of the ERM, only
to lambast her European colleagues’ project for monetary union a few weeks later. Her
famous “No, No, No” speech in Parliament on 30 October, just days after an acrimonious
EEC  summit,  stridently  criticised  plans  for  monetary  union,  and  Jacques  Delors’
proposals for strengthening the EU institutions.8 It was to trigger her downfall. 
4 This article begins by reviewing briefly the early ambiguities of Thatcher’s positions on
Europe. It then examines the role Thatcher and her ally Lord Cockfield played in the
creation  of  the  Single  Market,  and  how  she  quickly  responded  to  the  mounting
integrationist ambitions of the Delors Commission. The article goes on to examine the
fiasco  of  Britain’s  ERM  membership  and  its  legacies.  It  then  analyses  how  Britain
shifted away from Europe’s  social  model  under Margaret  Thatcher,  drawing on the
“varieties of capitalism” literature, and ends by examining the inherent contradiction
between the  Conservatives’  drive  to  reduce  the  size  of  government  while  pursuing
globalisation. 
 
Britain’s complicated path to the Single Market project
5 The design and launching of the Single Market in the mid-1980s were arguably the
high-point of Britain’s membership of the EEC/EU. With Denmark and Ireland, the UK
only  entered  the  common  market  in  1973,  under  the  Conservative  government  of
Edward  Heath.  Yet  only  two  years  later,  the  then  Labour  government  organised  a
referendum on membership of the EEC, and 67% of the voters favoured remaining.9 As
today,  both Britain’s  major parties  were split  on the issue,  and Harold Wilson held
Britain’s first referendum ever as a means to overcome divisions in the party: Jeremy
Corbyn voted leave at the time.10 
6 Despite the strong vote to remain in the EEC, Britain soon again signalled profound
doubts about the European project  by staying out of  the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM).  This  was  the  centre-piece  of  the  EEC’s  European Monetary  System (EMS),  a
major Community policy launched in March 1979 to limit exchange rate fluctuations
between member currencies. The UK’s reluctance to join can be partly put down to
continued reticence over  Europe by Labour and its  new leader  and Prime Minister
James  Callaghan.11 But  as  Nathalie  Champroux  has  pointed  out,  advice  from  the
Treasury was unenthusiastic, especially given that an attempt to limit exchange rate
fluctuations among European countries in 1972 had been costly and had failed.12
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7 The incoming Conservative government, elected in May 1979 under the leadership of
Margaret Thatcher, was no more interested in EMS membership either. This followed a
similar  desire  to  limit  the  UK’s  European  engagement,  and  the  fact  that  the
Conservatives came to power with the clear ambition to pursue monetarism as a new
macroeconomic  policy,  while  favouring  market  forces  instead  of  government
intervention.  Pegging  the  pound  to  other  EEC  currencies  would  have  tied  the
government’s hands on monetary and run counter to its free-market ideology.13 
8 In  fact,  Margaret  Thatcher’s  first  years  in  office  were  characterised  by  a
confrontational  relationship  with  her  European  partners,  as  she  tried  to  reduce
Britain’s large, net budget contributions to the EEC. This imbalance was largely due to
the UK paying significant tariffs on food imports from its historical (Commonwealth)
suppliers, while Britain’s relatively small and efficient agricultural sector received little
financial support from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).14 For Britain’s partners,
Thatcher’s demands to “get [her] money back” were seen as non communautaire: penny-
pinching ignoring the wider aims of the European project. This budget battle raged on
until the Fontainebleau summit of 1984, when Britain was granted its budget rebate.
 
From the “Thatcherisation of Europe” to the Bruges
Speech
9 With  the  budget  issue  settled,  a  more  constructive  chapter  opened  up  in  Britain’s
relations with the EEC,  with Britain being fully  engaged in the development of  the
Single Market. Its aim was to open up fully Europe’s national economies, notably by
bringing down non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  to  trade  in  goods  and especially  services.
These included national public procurement policies by public sectors;  idiosyncratic
health and safety regulations; regulations limiting access to professions by nationals,
etc. By adopting the principle of “mutual recognition”, the Single Market project made
such NTBs obsolete as products deemed acceptable in one country must be recognised
by all  other Member States (in areas where harmonised European standards do not
exist).  It  is  this  principle  which  today,  for  instance,  gives  financial  institutions
(including  foreign  entities)  established  in  the  UK their  “passporting  rights”  to  sell
services throughout the European Union, as they are regulated by the UK authorities.
On leaving the EU, such foreign and British-owned institutions will lose these rights. 
10 The creation of  the  Single  Market  was  based on the  implementation of  nearly  300
European Directives to remove impediments to cross-border business. This is a process
which is still going on in some public services: for example, France is set to open up rail
services to private, and potentially foreign, operators as of 2021. More generally, the
Single  Market  project  established  the  four  freedoms  of  the  movement  of  goods,
services,  capital  and  people.  These  freedoms  lie  at  the  heart  of  Britain’s  Brexit
predicament as the referendum in 2016 was much about controlling immigration, while
having continued access to the Single Market is supported by many businesses. 
11 At the time, the whole project was based on a White Paper published by the European
Commission in 1985 and entitled Completing the Internal Market.15 It was drafted under
the supervision of Lord Arthur Cockfield, a close Thatcher ally whom she nominated to
the European Commission headed by Jacques Delors in 1984, in part to hold Delors in
check.16 But things turned out rather differently. Cockfield strongly believed in opening
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up markets. He was highly effective in implementing EU legislation to bring down trade
barriers, and this deregulatory/liberalisation thrust of the Single Market explains why
it became known as “Thatcherisation of Europe”. For his part, Delors was happy to let
Cockfield  pursue  his  work,  seeing  the  Single  Market  as  a  means  for  achieving
“Economic and Monetary Union essentially leading to European Union”.17 
12 Lord Cockfield’s zeal in pursuing market integration – including VAT harmonisation
across the Community – ultimately however ran into resistance from Thatcher,  the
Treasury  and  the  Foreign  Office.  Moreover,  his  assertion  in  June  1988  that  Britain
would  eventually  have  to  drop  its  opposition  to  a  single  European  currency  led
Thatcher not to reappoint him to the Commission, as he had “go[ne] native”.18 By this
stage, however, she – and arguably the UK as a whole – had been locked in on several
points. First, Cockfield’s project had become a legally-binding European Treaty, rather
than a mere agreement among Member States which Thatcher favoured.19 It therefore
constituted a clear institutional step to closer integration. Secondly, the preamble of
the Single European Act specifically brought the goal of strengthening economic and
monetary  union  into  the  Treaties  of  the  Communities.  The  SEA  also  established
qualified  majority  voting  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  as  the  basis  for  adopting  EU
Directives. This fundamental shift away from unanimity voting greatly improved EU
decision-making, but it  also weakened the direct power of national governments to
oppose policies.  Furthermore,  the SEA strengthened the consultative  powers  of  the
European Parliament, and it nuanced Member States’ powers to block measures that
went against important national interests (the so-called Luxembourg compromise).20 
13 Overall, the SEA therefore bound the UK into the EEC and into European law far more
tightly than had been the case before. Some Conservatives like the highly influential Sir
Edward du Cann explicitly drew attention to the broader implications of the Act, as it
went through Parliament, noting that the Act was “probably… the largest constitutional
measure that the House has had to discuss since our discussions on the European Communities
Act 1972”.21 
14 Moreover, Jacques Delors soon made clear that the Single Market was only a stepping
stone to economic and monetary union, leading to a rift between Thatcher and the
Commission President in 1988. Two events in particular sparked Thatcher’s defence of
national sovereignty in her Bruges Speech. The first was a speech given by Delors to the
European Parliament  in  July  1988,  setting out  the importance of  strengthening the
Community’s  social  progress,  and  developing  European government.  Indeed,  Delors
even went so far as to assert that “[t]en years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and
perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin”.22 Then, in
September  1988,  Delors  made  a  landmark  speech  at  the  annual  conference  of  the
Trades Union Congress, in which he underlined the importance of consolidating social
and economic rights in the EEC and supporting collective bargaining at the European
level.23 Delors  was  given  a  standing  ovation,  and  the  British  union  movement
subsequently became far more pro-European.24 
15 To  Thatcher,  these  integrationist  ambitions  and  her  view  that  the  Commission’s
competencies  were  progressively  expanding  into  new areas  raised  a  fundamentally
threatening question: “Were British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the common law,
our  traditional  sense  of  fairness,  our  ability  to  run  our  own  affairs  in  our  own  way  to  be
subordinated  to  the  demands  of  a  remote  European  bureaucracy,  resting  on  very  different
traditions?”25 A  few  days  after  Delors’  TUC  appearance,  she  gave  her  iconic  Bruges
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Speech, outlining Britain’s place in 2,000 years of European history and culture. She
came out very much in favour of a Europe des nations, of a Europe that was not only the
European Community.  Moreover,  in  a  specific  rebuttal  to  Jacques Delors  she stated
emphatically that: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain,
only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new
dominance  from Brussels”.26 In  view of  Brexit,  it  must  also  be  recalled that  Thatcher
stated: “Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European
Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community”. While the Bruges Speech
became  in  many  ways  the  founding  text  of  Euroscepticism,  it  also  re-states  –
emphatically  –  Britain’s  longer-term inclination  of  favouring  closer  economic  links
with its partners, while rejecting the institutional and political integration of the EEC/
EU. 
16 The ambiguities of Mrs Thatcher’s position – and more generally the dilemma of the UK
since the signing of the SEA – could not be starker. On the one hand, she and her allies
welcomed the market liberalisation of the Single Market. On the other hand, they were
deaf to the integrationist aspirations Jacques Delors and other European politicians and
in many ways to the ambition of European project from the outset. From a political
economy point  of  view there  is  also  a  major  contradiction  here.  Thatcher,  today’s
Eurosceptics and arguably neoliberals more generally fail to acknowledge sufficiently
that markets need laws and government to function. The creation of the Single Market
has necessarily led to the deepening of European law to allow it to operate, and this has
consolidated the primacy of EU law over national law. Moving forward to Brexit, there
already is inevitably today, for example, a tug-of-war between the UK and the EU over
which court(s)  will  have the final  say over future economic relations between both
parties. 
 
Britain’s ERM debacle and the surge of Euroscepticism
17 Margaret Thatcher was also a key player in the next major episode of the emergence of
British Euroscepticism. After a decade of putting off ERM membership until the “time
[was] right”, she oversaw entry of the pound into the ERM during the last days of her
premiership.  This  strategic  policy  decision was  based on two sets  of  economic  and
political  considerations.  But,  it  turned out  to  be  a  spectacular  comedy of  errors  in
Britain’s relationship with the European Union.
18 The  economic  case  for  joining  the  ERM  was  based  on  the  on-going  imperative  of
fighting  inflation.  Since  the  1970s,  Britain  had  had  a  poor  record  on  controlling
inflation, and the switch to monetarism when the Conservatives came to power in 1979
did not lead to immediate improvements as it was accompanied by other policies that
stoked inflation: notably the increase in VAT from 8% to 15% in June 1979, to pay for
income tax cuts.27 Although inflation did subsequently come down, as high interest
rates squeezed the economy and along with a surging pound caused manufacturing
output to collapse and unemployment to rise to more than 3 million by 1986, price
increases were never fully under control during the 1980s,  and in fact began rising
again at the end of the decade. This was in no small part due to the so-called “Lawson
boom”,  driven  by  house  price  rises  (aggravated  by  financial  market  deregulation),
significant tax cuts in 1988, and a lax monetary policy Nigel Lawson ended up pursuing
inadvertently.28 As  the  monetarism of  the  early  Thatcher  years  had not  worked as
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predicted, the government looked for other ways to fight inflation. Eventually, Lawson
turned  to  Europe  for  inspiration,  following  widely-held  economic  opinion  that  the
anchoring  of  their  currencies  to  the  Deutschmark  via  the  ERM  had  allowed  other
countries  to  combat  inflation  successfully  (notably  France  and  Italy).  Accordingly,
Lawson began an unofficial policy of “shadowing the mark” in early 1987. International
events  however  undermined  this  strategy,  as  a  massive  stock  exchange  crash  in
October  1987  led  the  US  and  other  central  banks  to  cut  interest  rates,  while  the
Deutschmark also experienced weakness in international markets. To give credibility to
his  policy  of  shadowing  the  mark,  Lawson  felt  obliged  to  follow  the  mark’s
depreciation,  by  keeping  UK  interest  rates  low.29 This  unfortunately  encouraged
renewed inflation, and led to an increasingly fractious relationship between Thatcher
and Lawson, culminating in his resignation in October 1989.30 There followed a hiatus
for a year in which house prices, the economy and inflation continued to surge, fuelling
further  debate  within  the  Tory  leadership,  business  and  the  press  about  ERM
membership.
19 The economic case for joining the ERM was then backed up by the dramatic changes in
global  politics.  In  November  1989  the  Berlin  Wall  came  down  fairly  unexpectedly,
following  political  changes  in  the  Soviet  Union  since  the  middle  of  the  1980s  and
massive  demonstrations  in  East  Germany  during  the  summer  that  year.  In  quick
succession, the countries of Eastern Europe went though mainly peaceful revolutions,
casting out previous, Soviet-backed regimes, while Germany itself was reunited on 3
October 1990. Germany’s (West) European partners had little choice but to go along
with this, though many like Thatcher and François Mitterrand had reservations about a
larger, united Germany re-emerging. In exchange for their acceptance of reunification,
the German government led by Helmut Kohl signed up emphatically to economic and
monetary union and hence relinquishing the Deutschmark, the economic and political
cornerstone of Germany’s post-War reconstruction.
20 Given these astounding shifts in Europe’s geopolitical tectonics, pressure on Thatcher
to accept ERM membership – as a strategy for combating inflation and for keeping the
UK at the centre of European politics – became overwhelming.31 And so, on Friday 5
October  1990,  the  government  announced,  somewhat  unexpectedly,  that  the  pound
would join the ERM. Britain’s European partners were given practically no advanced
warning, and there was something sleight of hand about this political manoeuvre. It
was a major decision and it turned out to be fateful for Britain’s future relationship
with the EU. Within weeks, Thatcher gave her famous “No. No. No.” speech which led to
her  unprecedented  sacking  by  Conservative  MPs.32 More  fundamentally,  to  attract
foreign capital to finance reunification and to control inflation, Germany’s central bank
held interest rates high during the following years. As a result, other countries like
Britain, France and Italy in particular were forced to keep their own interest rates high
in order to support their currencies within the ERM, despite the significant recession
the major world economies experienced in the early 1990s.33 
21 In Britain, the housing market crashed, output slumped and unemployment again rose
above 3 million. This second deep recession under the Tories did finally wring inflation
out of the economy, abetted by a decade of anti-union legislation and major industrial
disputes  which  much  weakened  the  ability  of  Britain’s  workers  to  fight  for  pay.
Although the Conservatives under John Major were re-elected for a fourth time in April
1992, they found themselves under increasing political and financial market pressure
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to improve the economy. Some attempts were made to lower interest rates slightly.
However,  during  the  summer  and  especially  from  August  1992  onwards,  financial
markets  began betting against  the  pound (and Italian  lira)  and their  governments’
ability  to  maintain ERM parities.  Events  came to a  head on “Black Wednesday”,  16
September,  when  Chancellor  Norman  Lamont  announced  the  government  was
suspending  the  pound’s  membership  of  the  ERM:  dramatic  efforts  that  day  to  buy
sterling, while hiking interest rates first to 12% and then 15% had failed to stem market
selling of the pound. The Italian government made the same move two days later.
22 This  was a  dark moment for  John Major and his  colleagues.  They had staked their
reputations on Britain’s credible membership of the ERM and their policy had ended
ignominiously. The government’s reputation never recovered, even though it managed
to elaborate a new – successful – macroeconomic policy framework quite quickly. This
was based on using short term interest rates to target inflation directly, and giving the
Bank  of  England  a  greater,  more  transparent  say  in  policy.  Ultimately,  these
arrangements paved the way for Gordon Brown as Chancellor to introduce operational
independence for the Bank of England to set interest rates, when New Labour came to
power in May 1997. Yet the ERM debacle also led to Gordon Brown’s own weariness of
joining the Eurozone, and when he came to office he quickly set out “five tests” to
determine whether joining the Eurozone was in Britain’s economic interests. The broad
nature of these tests largely precluded a simple binary choice, and it is not surprising
that Brown, his special advisor Ed Balls and analysts at the Treasury concluded in the
autumn of 1997 that the time was not right for Britain to adopt the euro at its launch in
1999. A far more detailed economic analysis was conducted in 2003 and again it was
concluded that the time was not right. The economic caution of the Chancellor, his
advisors  and  the  Treasury  held  sway  over  the  more  optimistic  and  pro-European
sentiments of Prime Minister Tony Blair.34 
23 As for the Conservatives, the crashing out of the ERM, followed by Britain’s economic
success  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  played  a  substantial  role  in  strengthening
Euroscepticism. In the words of Europhile Tory grandee Kenneth Clarke, “the ERM crisis
had put a match to the dry tinder of resentment that backbench and grassroots Conservatives
continued to feel about the fall of Margaret Thatcher two years earlier..... Black Wednesday had
opened the Eurosceptic floodgates.”35 After they lost office in 1997, the Conservatives were
led by harder, right-wing Eurosceptics: William Hague, Ian Duncan-Smith and Michael
Howard, whose anti-European positions were prominent in their political positioning.
As  Agnès  Alexandre-Collier  recalls,  by  the  time  the  more  centrist  David  Cameron
became leader in 2005, the party had become far more Eurosceptical.36 In terms of path
dependency,  the  ERM  episode  marked  an  irreversible  break  point  which  set  the
Conservative party and UK-EU relations on a more confrontational path, and ultimately
to the Brexit referendum. 
 
Britain’s “variety of capitalism” setting it apart from
Europe
24 If the sacking of Thatcher and the success of the UK economy after crashing out of the
ERM – “Black” Wednesday turned “White” – were key to the rise of Euroscepticism, it is
also useful to examine the structural changes of its economy which pulled Britain away
from its European partners. These too can be traced back to the Thatcher years. Put
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simply,  they  boil  down to  Britain  moving away from what  is  now often called  the
“European social model”, or as Delors said in his TUC speech the “uniquely European
model”,  including  “mechanisms  of  social  solidarity,  of  protection  of  the  weakest,  and  of
collective bargaining”.37 
25 Neoliberal policies of deregulation, tax reduction and the general weakening of labour
compared to capital have affected most of the world since the 1970s and 1980s, yet
Britain  has  gone  further  down  the  path  of  neoliberalism  than  its  main  European
partners. This has created a structural, economic divergence which underpins Brexit,
coming on top of  the other political,  institutional  and cultural  considerations.  This
economic divergence can also be traced back to Margaret Thatcher’s leadership of the
Conservative party, and today it is important to the economic visions of Conservative
“Brexiteers” based on rolling back EU regulation and pursuing independent free trade
agreements internationally: in the words of Nigel Lawson, for example, a leader of the
2016 Leave campaign, Brexit provides the opportunity “to make the UK the most dynamic
and freest country in the whole of Europe: in a word, to finish the job that Margaret Thatcher
started”.38 
26 To  examine  Britain’s  specific  trajectory,  I  draw  on  key  texts  of  the  “varieties  of
capitalism”  literature,  which  identified  different  types  of  capitalism  in  old
industrialised countries, in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The ensuing
typologies are now dated,  not covering the development of  China.  Yet they remain
relevant  to  examining  how  countries  in  “the  West”  evolved  in  response  to  the
stagflation of the 1970s, and how the Conservatives set the UK on a different path to its
European partners.  Indeed, in today’s world, it  is difficult to recall  that Britain had
been a pioneer of European social democracy after 1945, or that the Conservatives and
then Labour tried to emulate French indicative planning in the UK during the 1960s. It
is hard to remember that top income tax rates in the UK (and the United States!) were
considerably higher than in France and Germany through to the end of the 1970s, and
that levels of income inequality were very similar in all these countries. 
27 Yet as the 1970s wore on, Mrs Thatcher and the “New Right” of Conservative thinkers
turned  increasingly  to  the  monetarist  and  neoliberal  ideas  emerging  from  the
University of Chicago, and the network of free-market think-tanks on both sides of the
Atlantic. Over time, this led to Britain converging on the more free-market form of
capitalism  which  was  reasserting  itself  in  the  United  States.  Aspects  of  market
deregulation  had  been  adopted  by  the  Democratic  Presidency  of  Jimmy  Carter
(1977-1981) in areas of transport. Carter also appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of
the  Federal  Reserve  in  1979  to  apply  monetarism to  fight  inflation.  But  it  was  the
Republican  Presidency  of  Ronald  Reagan  (1981-1989)  which  really  entrenched
neoliberalism,  notably  through  the  implementation  of  its  supply-side  agenda.  This
included substantial tax cuts, further market deregulation and a confrontational stance
towards America’s (public sector) unions. Progressively, the weakening of labour in the
US  was  compounded  by  reforms  of  local  public  services  (leading  to  new  public
management  or  NPM),  and  the  relocation  of  industry  out  of  the  US  industrial
heartlands, first to so-called “right-to-work” states with weak labour regulations, and
then overseas as firms sought to increase shareholder value. These developments led to
what  the  French economist,  fonctionnaire and businessman Michel  Albert  called the
“neo-American” model, described in his book Capitalisme contre capitalisme.39 Published
in 1991, it  contrasts this new US model with what he called “Rhineland capitalism”
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(capitalisme rhénan). The latter entails far more financing by house-banks rather than
stock markets, meaning there is less pressure to achieve short term returns. Firms are
also more involved in training employees, and collective agreements establish working
conditions in sectors. Companies also have more stable relationships with suppliers and
clients.  Finally,  welfare  protection in  Rhineland capitalism is  more  developed.  This
model was traditionally most represented by Germany, but also by other continental
European  countries  like  Austria  and  the  Netherlands.  By  contrast,  the  Thatcherite
agenda  in  Britain  unfolded  in  parallel  to  events  in  the  United  States,  in  terms  of
weakening labour, deregulating markets (notably financial markets), and implementing
public  sector  reforms,  based  on  privatisation,  contracting  out  and  the  steady
application of NPM. 
28 This bi-polar view of capitalism was much extended in a landmark study coordinated
by  Peter  Hall  and  David  Soskice,  entitled  Varieties  of  Capitalism:  the  Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (2001).40 Based on the microeconomic observation
of  how  companies  operate  in  different  sectors  and  across  countries,  the  study
concluded that there are (were) essentially two types of capitalism, made up of liberal
market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).  Britain,  along
with the other English-speaking/“Anglo-Saxon” countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland,
New Zealand and the United States) was classified as LMEs in this study. At the risk of
over-simplifying,  this  means  that  relations  between  actors  in  these  economies
(companies,  employees,  finance,  suppliers  and  customers)  tend  to  be  arm’s  length,
market-based, contractual and less permanent. Firms resort more to financial markets
than  banks  to  obtain  funding.  They  are  less  involved  in  training  employees.
Technological innovation tends to be radical rather than progressive, as employees quit
their companies to create start-ups. Production networks with suppliers tend to be less
stable. This all contrasts with the more stable economic relationships to be found in
CMEs.
29 Finally, it is worth mentioning the pioneering typology of welfare states formulated by
the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. Published in 1990, The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism, identifies three prevailing welfare state types in North America and
Western Europe.41 The first,  Esping-Andersen calls  “liberal welfare states”,  in which
much “social” insurance is organised privately (notably pensions, but also health care).
Public transfer payments to individuals (such as unemployment support) tend to be
minimal  and means-tested.  By contrast,  “conservative  welfare  states”  involve  more
collective  provision,  with  benefits  often  being  income-related,  so  that  middle  class
households tend to defend such systems politically. However, these systems tend(ed) to
be  socially  conservative  because  historically  they  were  based  on  the  “male
breadwinner”  family  model.  Significantly,  such systems do  not  strive  for  top-down
income  redistribution.  Instead  they  are  based  on  horizontal  solidarity  within
professions, as social security contributions and payments are traditionally organised
by  profession.  From Esping-Andersen’s  perspective,  only  the  third  group of  “social
democratic” welfare states in Scandinavia are truly progressive. They (used to) provide
universal benefits to citizens that do not depend directly on their status as employees
in the labour market, and also redistribute(d) income vertically.
30 Taking these various analyses together,  it  becomes clear that the UK has distanced
itself  from  its  European  partners  in  several  ways.  The  market  deregulations  and
privatisations  of  the  1980s  and  1990s, including  that  of  financial  markets,  have
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strengthened the contractual nature of the British economy, and have consolidated the
use  of  capital  markets  by  companies.  Similarly,  the  Conservatives  under  Thatcher
implemented successive reforms to welfare policy to keep control on spending and to
increase the gap between paid work and welfare transfers.  Britain therefore passed
from having a more social  democratic welfare state to being more in line with the
liberal  one,  providing  minimal  welfare  benefits.  Tellingly,  the  Major  government
negotiated an opt-out from the EU’s Social Protocol, of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
This was obtained to maintain the UK’s more deregulated labour market: a particular
bone  of  contention  at  the  time  was  the  EU’s  Working  Time  Directive  limiting  the
working week to 48 hours, which the government was very keen to avoid. Major also
opposed implementing a minimum wage, another policy set out in the Social Protocol.
31 It was only when New Labour came to power in 1997 that the UK finally signed up to
the Social Protocol. However, in one area Britain under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown
continued a key policy shift by Thatcher, which still sets Britain apart quite strongly
from many other European countries. This concerns the role of unions as interlocutors
in companies, industries and nationally. When Thatcher came to office, she ended what
the British used to  refer  to  (quaintly  and pejoratively)  as  “beer  and sandwiches  in
Downing  Street”,  when  union  leaders  were  consulted  on  government  policy.  New
Labour’s policy was to keep out the unions, to keep social dialogue to a minimum, and
to perpetuate Thatcher’s dismantling of collective bargaining. 
 
Potential flaws in the “Global Britain” project
32 Moving  forward,  the  legacy  of  the  early  Thatcher  years  also  played  a  role  in  the
Coalition  government’s  “austerity”  policies  from 2010  onwards,  thus  worsening
Britain’s social climate in the run-up to the EU referendum. In the wake of exploding
government  deficits  and  debts  following  the  financial  crisis  (2007-2008),  the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition entered office and immediately adopted the
objective  of  eliminating Britain’s  public  deficit  (then at  10% of  GDP)  by the end of
Parliament  (2015).  Deep  cuts  were  implemented  in  a  wide  variety  of  areas  (except
health, pensions and overseas development aid). This downward pressure on spending
played its  part  in the economic flat-lining of  the British economy during the early
2010s. It was a controversial policy, attacked not just by the government’s opponents,
but was also by the IMF at the time. In rebutting such criticisms, George Osborne as
Chancellor of the Exchequer argued that tight control of government finances was vital
to  retain  credibility  with  financial  markets.  He  also  specifically  referred  to  the
experience of the first Thatcher government, which in 1981 cut the public sector deficit
in the middle of a deep recession. At the time, Thatcher was scathingly criticised by the
economics  profession,  but  with  hindsight  the  1981  budget  coincided  with  the
beginnings of an upturn in the economy. Osborne saw himself as applying the same
strategy, and seems to have been vindicated subsequently.42 The British economy did
pick  up  from  the  second  half  of  2013  onwards,  and  recorded  better  growth  than
elsewhere in Europe, through until the end of 2016. But Osborne’s policy was not only
driven by the expediency of reducing deficits, but also by his view that the size of the
State  should  be  shrunk  significantly.43 The  Brexit  referendum  suggests  that  his
neoliberal  enthusiasm for small  government was backfired.  The squeeze on welfare
support including big cuts to benefits and public services occurred just as immigration
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into the UK was surging. In the two years running up to the referendum, annual net
migration exceeded 300,000, half of which coming from the EU.44
33 Intuitively it  is easy to see that this policy-mix was risky. But there are underlying
economic reasons why the overall Conservative party strategy of pursuing economic
openness  and  less  public  spending  was  always  going  to  be  difficult.  In  his  subtle
analysis  of  The  Globalisation  Paradox,  the  Harvard-based  international  political
economist Dani Rodrik emphasises the strongly unbalanced costs and benefits which
trade  liberalisation  brings.  He  argues  that  while  international  trade  theory  has
historically favoured free trade decisively,  it  plays down the negative consequences
which  liberalisation  may  have  for  certain  social  and  economic  groups,  even  if  it
benefits society as a whole. He notes, for example, that a $1 improvement in national
welfare resulting from tariff cuts is likely to be accompanied by a $50 shift of resources
between groups within the economy. In other words, collectively everyone is better off,
but  a  minority  will  be  far  worse  off.  Moreover,  such  within-country  transfers  are
greater when existing tariffs are lower! 45
34 Dani Rodrik also returns to an economic study by a political scientist at Yale University
named David Cameron [sic] into examining why public spending rises over time. In
looking at various institutional and political factors, such as the political business cycle,
the influence of pressure groups on politicians. Cameron found that the single most
important  cause  for  higher  public  spending  was  the  exposure  of  an  economy  to
international  trade.  He  argues  this  occurs  because  governments,  in  response  to
institutional  pressure from voters  and unions,  pursue numerous policies  to  protect
their populations from the adverse consquences of trade openness. Though Cameron’s
work  was  published  in  the  late  1970s,  Rodrik’s  own  research  reaches  the  same
conclusions.
 
Graph: Dani Rodrik’s Impossibility Trilemma
35 More generally, Rodrik has attracted much attention in recent years for arguing that
globalisation brings with it a “trilemma”, or an “impossibility theorem” (see Graph). He
argues that i) democracy, ii) national sovereignty and iii) global economic integration
cannot be achieved simultaneously: countries are able to pursue any two of these three
objectives,  but  not  all  three.  If  for  example,  a  country  wants  to  preserve  national
sovereignty  and  democracy,  then  there  are  limits  to  it  pursuing  international
integration.  According to  Rodrik,  this  kind of  balance  existed  during  the  post-war,
Bretton Woods era, when trade liberalisation was still limited and financial flows across
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borders quite strongly regulated. Alternatively, a country may seek to pursue national
sovereignty and global integration. This was the situation which existed during the 19th
century,  a  period  Rodrik  calls  the  “golden  straightjacket”,  when  currencies  were
backed by gold, and democracy was generally limited. Finally, it is possible for nations
to  pursue  both  global  economic  integration  and  democracy,  but  at  the  expense  of
national  sovereignty.  Such  a  choice  involves  moving  towards  a  form  of  “global
federalism”,  which  Rodrik  cautions  is  difficult  to  achieve,  even  for  relatively  like-
minded nations as exist in the European Union. He concludes that any reform of the
international economic system must face up to the constraints of this trilemma.46
36 Applying  these  analyses  by  Rodrik  to  the  Thatcherite  agenda  sheds  light  on  the
contradictions of supporting the creation of the Single Market while simultaneously
seeking  to  maintain  national  sovereignty  and  democracy.  Conversely,  Brexit  vote
clearly stands out as a rejection of  European integration,  and is  much defended by
Brexiteers as an expression of democracy. Whether root-and-branch change of Britain’s
economic and political system based on a 52 percent majority of a 72 percent turnout is
actually democratic may be debated. But the Conservative Brexiteer project of finishing
the Thatcher revolution by further strengthening market forces as part of  a Global
Britain strategy carries its own risks of aggravating income and wealth inequalities and
undermining the kind of democracy usually associated with a more inclusive society. 
 
Conclusion
37 Many of the profound difficulties the UK currently has over Brexit may be traced back
to the Thatcher era. Britain has always been ambivalent about the European project,
showing a strong degree of path dependency in favouring economic ties yet almost
consistently  rejecting  institutional  and  political  integration.  Margaret  Thatcher’s
support for the creation of the European Single Market as a form of trade liberalisation
greatly  compounded this  ambivalence.  By definition,  the  opening up and economic
integration of Europe’s national economies set out in the Single Market programme
necessarily called for more EU legislation and law (interpreted by the European Court
of Justice). The Single Market Act also explicitly called for more monetary cooperation.
Greater integration was clearly the goal of Jacques Delors and others, building on the
original  call  by  the  Treaty  of  Rome  for  “ever  closer  union  among  the  peoples  of
Europe”. Furthermore, Thatcher played a key role in Britain joining the ERM, while her
defenestration by Conservative MPs and the subsequent ejection of the pound from the
ERM in 1992 lit the flame of Euroscepticism.
38 Margaret  Thatcher’s  policy  legacy  also  pushed  Britain  further  down  the  road  of
neoliberalism than its European partners. It arguably created the economic basis for
Brexit,  and  so-called  hard  Brexiteers  are  seeking  to  pursue  the  neoliberal  agenda
further,  with  tax  cuts,  market  deregulation  and  tariff  reduction.  Such  an  overall
strategy will likely expose certain industries and farming in the UK to severe losses.
This  will  surely  aggravate  Britain’s  social  inequalities  further,  with  potentially
significant political consequences. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article begins by recalling the early ambiguities of Margaret Thatcher’s positions on Europe,
and then the role Britain played in the creation of the Single Market as of 1986. This has often
been referred to as the “Thatcherisation of Europe”, and the launching of the Single Market was
the high-point of Britain’s involvement in the EEC/EU. The article goes on to look at the rising
tensions  between  Britain  and  its  partners  that  followed  soon,  notably  as  Jacques  Delors’
integrationist aspirations became clearer. Mrs Thatcher’s position at that point, stated clearly in
her  Bruges  Speech  of  September  1988,  summarises  starkly  Britain’s  consistent  reluctance  to
engage in the process of institutional and political convergence that has always been part of the
European  project.  Such  tensions  gave  way  to  deepening  Euroscepticism  in  the  Conservative
party, in the wake of Britain’s thwart membership of the ERM/EMS (1990-1992). The article then
examines  how  Britain  shifted  away  from  Europe’s  post-war  social  model  under  Margaret
Thatcher, drawing on the “varieties of capitalism” literature, and argues that this created the
economic  foundations  for  Brexit.  The  article  ends  by  examining  the  inherent  contradiction
between the Conservatives’  drive to reduce the size of government since the global financial
crisis and Great Recession, while at the same time pursuing globalisation: it draws here on the
work of Dani Rodrik and his political “trilemma” of the world economy.
Cet article commence par rappeler les ambiguïtés de Margaret Thatcher concernant l’Europe,
puis le rôle que le Royaume-Uni a joué dans la création du marché unique à partir de 1986 : un
projet  souvent  appelé  « la  Thatcherisation  de  l’Europe ».  C’était  le  point  culminant  de  la
participation britannique à la construction européenne. L'article examine ensuite les tensions
croissantes qui ont suivi peu après entre le Royaume-Uni et ses partenaires, notamment lorsque
les aspirations intégrationnistes de Jacques Delors sont devenues plus claires. La position de Mme
Thatcher, énoncée clairement dans son discours de Bruges au mois de septembre 1988, résume
clairement  la  réticence  persistante  du  Royaume-Uni  à  s’engager  dans  le  processus  de
convergence  institutionnelle  et  politique  qui  a  toujours  fait  partie  du  projet  européen.  Ces
tensions ont laissé la place à un euroscepticisme grandissant au sein du Parti conservateur, à la
suite  de  l’adhésion  malheureuse  de  la  livre  au  Système monétaire  européen (1990-1992).  En
s’appuyant sur la littérature sur les «variétés du capitalisme», l’article se penche ensuite sur la
façon  dont  le  Royaume-Uni  s’est  écarté  du  modèle  social  européen  d'après-guerre  sous  les
gouvernements de Margaret Thatcher et  il  affirme que cette évolution a jeté certaines bases
économiques du Brexit. L’article se termine par une analyse de la contradiction inhérente entre
la  volonté des  Conservateurs  de réduire  la  taille  du secteur public  depuis  la  crise  financière
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mondiale et la Grande Récession, tout en poursuivant une politique favorable à la mondialisation.
Cette analyse s'inspire des travaux de Dani Rodrik et de son « trilemme politique » en ce qui
concerne l'économie mondiale.
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